Sveitsiläiset asiantuntijat ovat vahvistaneet jo aiemmin julki tulleen tiedon, jonka mu- kaan palestiinalaisten presidentin Jasser Arafatin vaatteissa oli jälkiä radioaktiivises-ta poloniumista. Heidän mukaansa havainto tukee olettamusta jonka mukaan Arafat saatettiin myrkyttää.

Lääketieteellisessä The Lancet -lehdessä julkaistu artikkeli kertoo yksityiskohtaisesti tutkijaryhmän havainnoista. Ne ovat yhdenmukaiset viime vuonna julkaistun uutisen kanssa. Se pohjautui yhden tutkijan tv-haastatteluun.

Arafat kuoli vuonna 2004 sairaalassa Ranskassa. Lääkärit eivät kyenneet kertomaan kuolinsyytä, ja Arafatin perheen pyynnöstä ruumiinavausta ei tuolloin tehty.

Arafatin ruumis nostettiin haudasta viime marraskuussa sen selvittämiseksi,oliko hän kuollut myrkytykseen. Lisäksi tutkittavana on vaatteita ja Arafatin muuta omaisuutta, jonka hänen leskensä on antanut kokeita varten.

Ristiriitaisia oireita

Edelleen jatkuvaa tutkimusta tehdään erikseen Sveitsissä, Ranskassa ja Venäjällä. The Lancetin raportoimaan tutkimukseen osallistuu kahdeksan Lausannen yliopiston rikoslääketieteen asiantuntijaa.

Heidän mukaansa useissa Arafatin vaatteista otetuissa koepaloissa oli verta ja virt-saa, joiden polonium 210 -pitoisuus on korkeampi kuin vertailunäytteissä. Löytämis-tään määristä tutkijat ovat laskeneet, että Arafatin kuolinhetkellä poloniumia oli niin paljon, että se riittää tappamaan ihmisen.

Myös Arafatin oireet - oksentelu, väsymys ja vatsakivut - olivat sellaiset, ettei polo- niummyrkytystä voida sulkea pois kuolinsyiden joukosta, joskin tyypillisistä oireista puuttui muun muassa hiusten lähtö, raportissa sanotaan.

Lähteet: AFP, Yle Uutiset. "

Keskustelua:

Norppa kommentoi_ 14. lokakuu 2013 17:40

Siinäpä sellainen poppoo, että Sherlock Holmesinkin olisi vaikea selvittää, kuka miljoonasta halukkaasta on murhaaja.

Spammiro Botti kommentoi_ 14. lokakuu 2013 18:22

Taisi selvitä Berezovskille heti kun alettiin tutkimaan tuolta kannalta, että nyt se käry tulee...

Heikki Karjalainen kommentoi_ 14. lokakuu 2013 19:00

Tämänhän tiesi mamman uutistoimistokin siihen aikaan, että näin on käynyt. Sekä USA että Israel ovat peitelleet asiaa vai kuka ? Onko Venäjä ollut mukana? Ota siitä selvää?

Keränen kommentoi_ 14. lokakuu 2013 19:07

Tai sitten Arafatin lähipiirissä ( sattuneesta syystä ) kaikkien hihat ovat enemmän tai vähemmän poloniumilla ja muillakin myrkyillä kyllästetyt mutta Jasser sattuikin kuolemaan luonnollisesti.

Jukka Mäki kommentoi_ 14. lokakuu 2013 19:37

Hamas myrkytti!

Arafat oli fatahin johtaja!

Teho Paketti kommentoi_ 14. lokakuu 2013 19:54

Arafatilla oli omissa joukoissa ihan tarpeeksi vihulaisia.

Aina tietenkin voidaan hoopoilla jonkun salaliittoteorian pohjalta.

Mutta kyllä se oli Kiribatin sissiliike joka Arafatin myrkytti.

Ne ei voinu sietää virnuilua.

Spammiro Botti kommentoi_ 14. lokakuu 2013 23:51

Mistä Hamas olisi saanut poloniumia?

Teho Paketti kommentoi_ 15. lokakuu 2013 00:07

Maailmalla myydään vaikka mitä. Ei kun ostoksille.

veikko mäkitalo kommentoi_ 15. lokakuu 2013 09:20

Voipi olla jokin "pamputtaja" Ranskassa, varsinainen SUHAri Armanin puvussa....

***

Brittiläisen imperiumin Balfourin julistuksen "(establishing) a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine" voidaan kääntää ja tulkita ainakin kolmella suuresti toi-staan poikkeavalla tavalla. Tässä Sovjetskaja entsiklopedijassa lainausmerkit termin sisällä ont NL:n ja muiden YK:n Turvallisuus- neuvoston jäsenten tulkinnasta niiden esittäessä Yleiskokoukselle Palestiinan jakopäätöstä.

https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Palestine

" ... In the mid-19th century, particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the strategic and economic importance of Palestine increased,and the European po-wers competed for influence in the region. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the imperialist powers made use of Zionism, the reactionary chauvinistic ideology of the Jewish bourgeoisie, in their struggle for control over Palestine. One of Zionism’s chief aims was the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, where Jews from various countries could resettle.

During World War I, British troops occupied Palestine. On Nov. 2, 1917, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration, promising to promote the creation of a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. At the San Remo Conference in April 1920, Great Britain received a mandate to govern Palestine, which was ratified by the League of Nations in July 1922. In September 1922, Great Britain created the mandate of Transjordan, out of part of Palestine. The Balfour Declaration did not extend to Transjordan. ... "

A: Kuin edellinen isäntäimperiumi Turkki: "palestiinanjuutalaisen kansan (millet) kotialueeksi",johon ideaan Turkki suhtautui periaatteessa myönteisesti,ja salli sinne juutalaisten maahanmuuttoakin mm. Venäjältä:

" German and Ottoman reaction

Immediately following the publication of the declaration Germany entered negotia-tions with Turkey to put forward counter proposals. A German-Jewish Society was formed: Vereinigung jüdischer Organisationen Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rech-te der Juden des Ostens (V.J.O.D.) and in January 1918 the Turkish Grand Vizier, Talaat, issued a statement which promised legislation by which "all justifiable wishes of the Jews in Palestine would be able to find their fulfilment". ^[33]

Tuossa vaiheessa Turkki oli kuitenkin menettänyt auktoriteettinsa tällaisissa asioissa armenialaisten kansanmurhan takia.

B: Kuin siionisti: "(Maailman) juutalais"kansan" ("rodun", race) kansallisena kotivaltiona (koko) Palestiinassa (ja vielä laajemmallakin: Transjordaniassa, Syyriassa, Libanonissa, Siinailla, Irakissa...)".

Tällä pääasiassa kuvitteellisten "lupausten" ja "sopimusten" uskonnollisella venyttämisellä ja paukuttamisella ei ole äärtä eikä rantaa, jos sitä myötäillään.

C: Kuten Brittiläinen imperiumi tulkitsi, mikä on selvästi nähtävissä valmisteluasiakir- joista, ja Kansainliitto, joka oli konsultoinut asiat Britannialle mandaattihallintosopi-muksella: "Juutalaisuskoisten ja -taustaisten ihmisten kansallisena valtiona (jonne voi esimerkiksi paeta vainoja). Sen enempää Brittiläinen imperiumi, Kansain-liitto kuin YK:kaan eivät ole tunnustaneet juutalaisia kansaksi, saati "roduksi"! vaikka jaettu on (ja monia muita menko kyseenlaisikin hakemuksia on hyväksytty).

"List of known drafts of the Balfour Declaration,showing changes between each draft

Final version

Text

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

Changes

His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race people, and will use its their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality. <sup>[145] "

Tämän pitäisi olla harvinaisen selvää tekstiä.</sup>

,,,,,

https://download.ssrn.com/07/01/09/ssrn_id956143_code337501.pdf

" NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW PUBLIC Law AND LEGAL THEORY SERIES NO . 06-34

3

5. On November 29,1947,the General Assembly adopted the key "partition" resolution, Reso-lution 181, ratifying the British proposals. It also provided for an independent international mixed status for the city of Palestine. In my opinion, this Resolution constitutes the first, last, and only legally authorized demarkation of the Israeli-Palestine borders. It was legally autho-ritative not because it took the form of a UN Resolution, but solely because the UN Resolu-tion itself served as a ratification of the British proposal to divide the Mandate and leave its governance to the people. In other words, the alpha and omega of the legal power resided in Great Britain as the trustee and not in the United Nations.As trustee,it had the power to parti-tion the territory if and only if that was the best way to provide for its future self-government. The General Assembly did not derive its legal powers directly from the Charter of the UN, but rather as surrogate for the League of Nations.

It was the League as a supervisory authority over the British Mandate that devolved its powers of mandate supervision to the UN and, through the UN, to the General Assembly itself. Legal title to the land was not conferred by Resolution 181 alone but rather by Great Britain's acceptance of the terms of Resolution 181.

The State of Israel owes its entire legal existence to the proper exercise by Great Britain of its League of Nations' Mandatory Power over the territory of Palestine. It owes nothing to the United Nations as a separate entity and, by the same token, cannot claim any additional rights from the United Nations. Instead, as soon as Resolution 181 was passed (Great Britain abstained), the legal borders between Israel and Palestine were forever fixed. Those borders henceforth could only be changed by one of two processes: first, explicit agreement between Israel and the authorized representatives of Palestine, and second, in the few cases of limited disputed areas where the verbal description contained in Resolution 181 was ambiguous in terms of existing maps or surveys, by international arbitration. The Security Council had and has no power to change international borders.

4

6. Although Israel proclaimed itself as a state within six months of Resolution 181, the Pales-tinians — for convoluted internal reasons plus the land-grabbing ambitions of surrounding Arab states — did not seriously entertain the idea of a State of Palestine for almost another forty years. In any event, as is well known, neighboring Arab states,proclaiming that the Uni-ted Nations had sold out the Palestinians, attacked Israel. To the world’s astonishment, Israel not only prevailed in the war, but beat back the Arab invaders and in the process doubled the previously partitioned territory of Israel. Israel then ousted the Palestinians who were living in the conquered area, and they have ever since been remitted to conditions of squalor in refugee camps that are black dots on the map of the Middle East.

7. The six-day war of 1967 further increased the size of Israel at the expense of the Palesti-nians. In the direct aftermath of the war, the Security Council of the United Nations, exerci-sing its Chapter 7 powers under the UN Charter, passed Resolution 242 calling for the with-drawal of Israeli forces “from territories of recent conflict” and “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.” Israel and the U.S. interpreted the Resolution’s call for "withdrawal from territories",and not "the" territories,as a less than complete withdrawal because the word “the” was not mentioned. The mild joke in circulation at the time was that anyone opposed to the U.S.-Israeli interpretation was  "anti-semantic". Israel took the position that it was there-fore not legally required to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that it had just conquered, and indeed that it could erect Israeli settlements in those territories.

5

8. But semantics aside, in my view the Security Council simply does not have the power to take land from A and give it to B, irrespective of its undoubted legal power in the event of a threat or breach of the peace to restore international peace and security.

The sanctity of international borders is a principle of international law that antedates the  Charter of the United Nations; in fact it goes back five thousand years. No smaller nation  would have supported the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 if the draft Charter had given to the five permanent members of the Security Council - the United States, Great Britain, France,Soviet Union,and Chin a - the legal power to change international fron-tiers. After all,the five permanent members at the time had been wartime allies,and in concert they could reshape the world at will if they had been given such an unprecedented power.

Moreover, there is nothing in the Charter of the United Nations that even remotely hints of a power or entitlement in the Security Council to change international borders.Even Resolution 242 only calls for a withdrawal of forces, and makes no mention of a permanent change in boundaries.As far as the Israeli settlements are concerned, they are clearly illegal; an occupy-ing power has no right to engage in de facto annexation of portions of the occupied territory by way of population transfers.

9.Overshadowing the arguments in Paragraph 8 above is the undeniable fact that the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928, as definitively interpreted by the International Tribunal at Nurem-berg in 1948, has abolished forever the idea of acquisition of territory by military conquest. No matter who was the aggressor, international borders cannot change by the process of war. 

6

Resort to war is itself illegal, and while self-defense is of course legal, a successful campaign of self-defense cannot extend so far as to constitute a new war of aggression all its own. And if it does, the land taken may at best be temporarily occupied, but cannot be annexed. Thus after all the Middle East wars, the bloodshed, aggressions and counter-aggressions, acts of terror, reprisals, and attendant UN resolutions, nothing has changed the legal situation as it existed after Resolution 181 was passed in 1947. The legal boundaries of Israel and Palestine remain today exactly as they were delimited in Resolution 181.

10. Is the Palestine Mandate still in existence? I think it is. Although the Mandate was dated to expire in August 1948, an essential term, namely the creation of an "Arab state," was not fulfilled. Of course this was the fault of the neighboring Arab countries, but one still has to protect the beneficiaries of the trust, namely, the people living in the area. The Jewish people were protected by the creation of their state, but the  Palestinian people were not protected.

Therefore I would argue that the Mandate survives until its substantive terms are fulfilled. The most important substantive requirement still unmet is the creation of an Arab State (Pa-lestine). Another important requirement, which is an issue for another Forum, is the Partition Plan’s provisions for the establishment of an international city of Jerusalem.

11. Many things have changed “on the ground” since 1948.Mass population movements have made it impractical to return to the legal boundaries set forth in the Partition Plan of 1947. In the protracted peace process, Israel has been offered its pre-1967 boundary in return for nor-malized relations with Palestine and the neighboring Arab states. This deal would give Israel more than double the territory specified in the Partition Plan. If I were an Israeli, I would take the deal. But maybe if I were an Israeli living in Israel, I might have second thoughts.

7

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE LENGTHY DISCUSSION POSTED ON JURIST:

1 LEERON KOPELMAN: Do the treaties signed by Israel and Egypt, Jordan and most  im-portantly between Israel and the Palestinian Authority modify the legal status in accordance with what is written at the end of point 5 in Professor D’Amato’s essay?

SAMEH MOBAREK: Can the majority approving UN GAR 181 justify the authoritative  nature of the resolution?

ANTHONY D’AMATO: Mr. Kopelman, the first thing to note is that only states can sign treaties. Thus the Palestinian Authority is excluded. Second, a treaty between A and B cannot change the territorial rights of C. So, my answer to your question would be "no."

As for Mr. Mobarek's question, United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 181 was not, in my view, a "resolution" in the normal sense of a nonbinding expression of attitude or policy by the General Assembly. Rather,in this special case,it was a surrogate for an autho-ritative finding by the Trusteeship Council which should have had jurisdiction over the Pales-tine question but was not given jurisdiction over it in the transition between the League of Nations and the United Nations. The "mandates" regime of the League had to go somewhere, and in my view it went to the UN as a whole, which means that it went to the General Assembly.

As a general matter — and in response to questions whether the Israel-Palestine conflict is  similar to many others — I think we're dealing here with a unique situation. That's why it's  even misleading to use words like "treaty" and "resolution" in this context,because they 1 For the full debate, see http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/israelborders.php obscure more than they disclose. 

The essence of the situation is that this is a mandate, a trusteeship if you will, that cannot be wholly conceptualized within the framework of law courts. It takes a certain amount of fami-liarity with the rise of the Chancery court system in England and the idea of equitable juris-prudence to get a handle on what the framers of the Covenant of the League of Nations had in mind. Palestine is the last remaining mandate, and we probably will not have a chance to use this ancient learning again,but it has turned out to be a very important mandate. We scho-lars do not have the time or talent to go to the Middle East and get on a soapbox or help dis-tribute food to the refugees or network at great length with distressed Israeli citizens, but we can do what we do best, which is to dig below the surface of the arguments and charges and invective that  characterize debates on this subject, and see if doing the "legal thing" might in some small way possibly help.

SAMEH MOBAREK: Professor D’Amato, thank you for your elaboration. I’ve always  be-lieved that the UN had authority over the mandate by virtue of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Chapters 11 and 12 of the subsequent UN Charter.

Great Britain, as mandatory power, had authority over the mandate as a proxy for the League of Nations. When they abandoned the mandate,they lost any special authority,aside from their power as a voting member of the General Assembly, to approve or disapprove any changes to the mandate (partition would certainly be one) as detailed in Article 79 of the UN Charter.

When the mandate was terminated, sole authority over the underlying trust territory reverted to the General Assembly (reference Article 85(1)). The Trusteeship Council’s purpose was to render assistance to the General Assembly in carrying out its (the General Assembly’s) duties in the trust territories (reference Article 85(2)). Consequently, the General Assembly had jurisdiction over the trust territory to pass UN GAR 181 and did so to discharge its duties in Article 76.

Perhaps what I am still a bit unclear about is the force behind UN GAR 181. This comes  back to the definition of an ‘authoritative finding’. As I understand it, a finding requires a  high level of consensus among UN members for it to become an ‘authoritative’ finding and part of international law. From explanations given, am I correct in assuming that a finding, in the context of UN GAR 181,is more like an ‘administrative’ finding by an authority with sub-ject matter jurisdiction and not so much an ‘authoritative’ finding within the context of inter-national law? Also, if the issue were ever brought before the ICJ,what weight would the court give to such a finding? What would be the key issues that the court would have to decide on?

ANTHONY D’AMATO: An authoritative finding in the context of an international Mandate or Trust is a mixed question of law and fact, or more precisely, a factual determination made under the aegis of the mandate instrument. When I worked on the South West Africa cases in the early 1960s, it was my job to draft the portions of the brief (for the plaintiff states Ethio-pia and Liberia) on the devolution of the South West African mandate as if it had been super-vised by the Trusteeship Council. (Like the Palestine Mandate, the South West African Mandate was never negotiated with the Trusteeship Council and so did not fall under the Trusteeship Council’s actual jurisdiction.) 

9
I made a number of proposed intermediate findings of fact concerning the situation in South West Africa — the degree of participation of the inhabitants in local government, the degree and universality and relevance of education, the economic well-being of the people,  opportu-nities for advancement, etc. All of these led up to my proposed ultimate authoritative finding: that an extension of the apartheid system into South West Africa would contravene the terms of the Mandate.The Mandate would be contravened because the well-being of the inhabitants would in all the particularities examined, be worsened rather than promoted by racial discri-mination. Except for the apartheid system, South West Africa by the 1960s was prepared to stand alone.

And indeed, in due course it became the independent nation of Namibia. It had come a long way from its Class C Mandate status.Palestine began as a Class A Mandate. The obstacle was not apartheid or any other overarching system; rather,it was the personal antagonism between Jews and Arabs, fueled not by the Palestinians but by the neighboring Arab states. This was an unprecedented situation for the UN. Palestine was clearly ready to become an independent state and get rid of its status as a Mandate, except for the fact that a democratic government would be divided pretty much down the middle, and waves of Jewish immigrants from Europe would upset whatever political balance might have been drawn between Arabs and Jews in a new government. In other words, but for the Arab-Jew division, Palestine could have been given its independence. Under this unique circumstance, it would not have made much sense for the UN to continue the Mandate.

The situation wasn't going to get any better;indeed,immigration would make it more  volatile. The people weren't going to get any closer to standing alone than they already were; they did not need more tutelage in self-government, for example. Thus the Mandate was all but ready to expire on its own -- except for the conflict between Arabs and Jews.

Thus, the reasonable solution led to an authoritative finding by the UN General Assembly  (acting for the UN as a whole, including the Trusteeship Council which did not have  juris-diction over Palestine) that splitting the country into two new nations would fulfill the terms of the Mandate. Thus independence would come to Palestine not as a unitary state but as two states. As I said earlier, Great Britain for political reasons did not want to endorse this proposal, but they had a lot to do with thinking it up, and they did not vote against it.

Thus Resolution 181 in November 1947 said, basically, that the two-state solution would ter-minate the Mandate, and that the partition should be thus-and-so (taking into account projec-ted Jewish immigration), along specified geographical lines and markers. Now, in fact, the UN's solution has been only half fulfilled.Israel became a state in 1948 but there was no com-parable Arab state (although of course,as has been mentioned in this forum, a number of Arab entrepreneurs gave it a good try in the hopes of installing themselves as the new government of the Arab state.) So what we were left with after Israel became a state in May, 1948, was a UN boundary line between the Israeli state and the forthcoming Arab state.In my opinion, no-thing since then has changed as a matter of law. Nothing Jordan has done, or Israel has done, or the UN Security Council has resolved (whether in Resolution 242 or any other), has affec-ted the international legal boundary. In particular, international boundaries do not change as a result of the use of force, for reasons previously given. What about the territory underlying the proposed Arab state? What is its status today? If you accept my argument, it follows that the "Arab" portion of Palestine is still a UN Mandate. It will cease to being a mandate if an Arab state comes into being.

10

Obviously, the negotiations for an Arab state -- now called the Palestinian State -- will deal with the boundary questions. But a sovereign state always has the right to cede portions of its territory. I imagine that the US and Israel and other negotiators will ask for a final "closing" that establishes a Palestinian State at the same moment that it fixes the boundaries of that new state. The Arabs have already proposed that these boundaries can be the pre-1967 boun-daries which give Israel more than double the land that was allocated under the 1947 Parti-tion. As I said at the outset, I think that's a pretty good deal for Israel. However, Israel has to decide for itself, just as the new Palestinian state has to decide for itself, whether it's a good deal. Like a successful labor negotiation, both sides have to walk away unhappy.

11

As a lay person, I thought that the 1949 Armistice Agreement, with the signature of the then leader of Jordan on the UN Map of Middle East (as well as the signature of the Army leader of the Jewish state of Palestine) per this web site  http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal/maps/arm_1948.jpg is sufficient proof of the Arab  world acceptance of Israel’s borders as pre 1967. Palestine as a statehood concept is a new construct that probably emerged just before the 1967. Thus the War of 1947-1948 ended with the sharing of the remaining Arab state of Palestine, amongst the Jews, Egypt and Jordan.

Maybe more than law (international GAR 181 or multi lateral or bilateral agreements after the cease fire) may be the Arab world notion of honor and gentlemen’s   agreement, and that may be why, hardly anyone holding political office in the Arab world (save for the minority not in power,who wish to eradicate Israel) raises this issue of going back to the 1947 borders, especially after Oslo (aborted) began. Even now all talks are based on pre 1967 borders. Pro-fessor Anthony D’Amato raised the legal construct of the GAR 181 as being a continuity of a Mandate, and thus it was unlike any other GAR.

Unless I have grossly misunderstood (which I may have as a lay person) Professor Anthony D’Amato, this begs the serious question whether this ‘powerful/empowering’ Mandate still ‘persists’ whereby it can give any GAR thereafter (apart from the ‘Founding’ GAR 181) on the Question of Palestine, an elevated ‘mandate’ status beyond that of a usual GAR. If all GARs when dealing with the Question of Palestine have this “elevated and empowering spe-cial status”, then does the GAR in December 1988 declaring PLO as Palestine, legally vest statehood on Palestine? Secondly,even in 1947,I assume as a lay person, that the UN Security Council had more power than UN General Assembly as is the case in contemporary times and now. So why is the GAR 181 considered by international law to be the effective instru-ment and not a resolution from the UN Security Council? If it were the UN Security Council resolution that we should be looking at, should it be an independent resolution deciding the same or at least affirming separately GAR 181? Thus Professor Anthony D’Amato’s legal thesis of the supremacy and invincibility of GAR 181 begs more unanswered questions, which I would be pleasedm to be receive answers/advice.

SAMEH MOBAREK: Mr. Anderson, I agree with your conclusion that returning to the 1947 partition plan would require Israeli consent. However, my reasons for reaching this  conclu-sion are likely to be different than yours. I believe it was Professor D’Amato that first said that any state can consent to the annexation of its own territory to another state.

In giving such consent, the annexation becomes an acceptable action under international law. In the Oslo Accord, the Palestinians accepted to limit the scope of peace negotiations to the pre-1967 border and to recognize Israel within borders established by the 1949 armistice. In this respect, they consented to Israeli annexation of territory earmarked for the ‘Arab’ state of UN GAR 181. It was Professor D’Amato’s original contention,which I agreed with, that such position was obviously favorable to the Israelis. If the Palestinians had not consented to this annexation, it is highly unlikely that the UN would have stepped in and enforced UN GAR 181. The UN has proven itself completely ineffective when it comes to issues dealing with Israel. Therefore, I agree with your statement that Israel would have to willingly consent and withdraw to the partition line for the partition plan to become a reality.

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ANTHONY D’AMATO: Yi Ling, you say that as a layperson you assume that the Security Council has more power than the General Assembly. I think you've answered your own ques-tion. Although laypersons may so think, a careful reading of the UN Charter in its entirety shows that the powers of both organs are limited. Indeed, the "range" of GA jurisdiction is much broader than the SC, while the military power of the SC is stronger within the Charter's specified limits. But in either case, the mandate power resided in the League of Nations, and when the League was extinguished in 1946, the mandate power devolved to the UN which had been established in 1945. It was contemplated that the Trusteeship Council would take over the mandate supervision, and for the most part that is what happened, but it did not happen with respect to Palestine nor with respect to South West Africa. Except for the fact that these are class A and C mandates respectively, much of the same legal analysis applies to both. As I argue, it is the GA, not the SC, which inherits the mandate supervisory power, as it's power is much broader than that of the Security Council. The latter properly stepped in when there was a threat to the peace in resolution 242, but it had no power to redraw the lines of the mandate, and in fact, did not attempt nor purport to do so.

YI LING: Professor has endeavored to elucidate the trust issue from the international law  point of view and I have endeavored to elucidate the trust issue from the commercial and  corporate law point of view,based on our different legal exposure. Initially,being untutored in international law, I too was swayed, over whelmed, enticed, distracted by the UN SCR and the precise terms in the UN GAR 181, where the latter in the same breath of partitioning also set a date for termination of the Mandate. However when I read the clues that the Professor gives from international law point of view and relate them to my own ground experience in commercial law practice, I can appreciate the Professor’s sound international law argument, that the Mandate exists until the Arab state of Palestine is created.

- end - "