Hulsey, J.L., Quan, Z., and Xiao, F., 2020:

A Structural Reevaluation of the Collapse of World Trade Center 7 Final Report.

Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, College of Engineering and Mines, Institute of Northern Engineering, Universityof Alaska Fairbanks

WTC 7 -rakennuksen romahduksen rakenteellinen uudelleenarvio - Loppuraportti

https://files.wtc7report.org/file/public-download/A-Structural-Reevaluation-of-the-Collapse-of-World-Trade-Center-7-March2020.pdf

Hallituksen NIST:n raportti WTC-7:sta, jota "tutkimus kritisoi":

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/NCSTAR/ncstar1a.pdf

Kirjoittajan kritiikki:

https://hameemmias.vuodatus.net/lue/2020/04/a-new-quack-reseach-on-wtc-7-collapse

A new quack reseach on WTC-7 collapse

Tutkimus on alkanut 1.5. 2015: http://ine.uaf.edu/wtc7

Leroy Hulsey


Tutkimuksen johtaja professori John Leroy Hulsey, s. 1941, filosofian tohtori (1976) konstruktiotekniikan alalta, rakennusinsinööri (1967). Hän on sillanrakennusteniikan tutkija, mutta ei ole tuotannossaan tutkinut rakenteiden lujuuksia vaan KESTÄVYYK- SIÄ esimerkiksi kulutusta ja säätilanvaihteluja vastaan. Hän on "pitkän linjan WTC-saliittoteoreetikko", ja hän on rahoittajan, Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth (AE911Truth) -organisaation valinta tutkimuksen johtajaksi. "Hylsyn" eng-lanninkieliset WIki-sivut on poistettu (mikä on tavallinen hölynpöllärisignaa- li), mutta saksalaiset löytyy (tavallista sekin...).

0.jpg

Zhili Quan, filosofian tohtori Alaskan yliopistosta 2018 (ilmeisesti tästä projektista), rakennusinsinööri Shenyang Jianzhu -yliopistosta Kiinasta vuodelta 2010. Hän näyttäisi olevan tutkimuksen varsinainen tekijä.

Feng Xiao

Feng Xiao, Ph.D., Associate Professor Nanjing University of Science and Technology Department of Civil Engineering.Fairbanks Research Faculty Dates Employed Jan 2016 – Dec 2016. Siltojen monitoroinnin eli tilantarkkailun spesilisti, tullut tukimukseen puoli vuotta sen alkamisen jälkeen ja lähtenyt vuoden kuluttua, kaksi vuotta ennen sen valmistumista.

Tämä on ensimmäinen ja toivottavasti myös viimeinen erityinen WTC-SALALIITTO-TEO-REETTINEN YLIOPISTOTUTKIMUS. Sellainen on USA:ssa mahdollista, sillä siellä yliopistot eivät ole valtiollinen virkavastuullinen tideorganisaatio, eikä maassa ole myöskään virallista Tiedeaktemiaa,joka olisi sitä "yliopistojen puolesta" ja valvoi- si niitä kuten esimerkiki Kiinassa ja entisessä Neuvostoliitossa, virkavastullinen tie-deorganisaatio ovat Liittovaltion (National, Federal) tutkimuslaitkset kuten avaruus-tutkimuslaitos NASA, terveysintituutti NIH, standardi- ja teknologiainstituutti NIST ja katastrofipelastus- ja nopean toiminnan virasto FEMA,joka tuollaisissa tilanteissa tie- teellisin perustein tilapäisesti ohittaa poliittisen ja myös rutiinivirkamiespäätöksente-on. NIST ja FEMA olivat keskeisiä ja tieteteellisesti kritisoitavia toimijoita myös tässä asiassa. Kyse on nytkin, mutta ei pelkästään, niiden toiminnan tutkimisesta.


7 WTC-alue


Screenshot_2020-04-05%20A%20Structural%2


Screenshot_2020-04-13%20A%20Structural%2

Näissä tutkimuksen kuvissa on Pohjois-, WTC 2, ja Etelätornin, WTC 1, numerot väärin päin. Matkustajajumbojetit osuivat 415 m korkeisiin torneihin. Kaikkiaan 2823 ihmistä kuoli, joista 1058 tunnistettiin jäänteistä.


WTC-torneja ei räjäytetty

Kansan ääni on kirjoittanut WTC-terrori-iskusta mm.niiden 10-vuotispäivän "kunniak- si" numerossa 4/2011 otsikolla "WTC-TORNEJA EI RÄJÄYTETTY". Toimitus tähdensi myös, että vaikka salaliittoja on, niin salaliittoteoriat eivät ole yhteiskunnan tieteellisen selittämisen metodi.

Torneja koskien emme ryhtyneet arvioimaan tarkkoja kuormituksia ja palolämpötiloja ja lentokoneiden näihin tuomia lisäyksiä ja niiden aiheuttamia rakenteiden vaurioita, vaan osoitimme jokaiselle rakenteista ja rakentamisesta yhtäämitään tietävälle jär-keenkäypästi, että tornit olisi ollut mahdollista luhistaa paikalleen just siten kuin ne nytkin sortuivat pudottamalla sopivalla paikalla (core-sisäseinän ja tube-ulkoseinän puolessavälissä riittävän korkealta yläkerroksista luokka 10 tonnin rautaromu”mälli” yläkerrasta alakertaan. Etenevä ja paisuva romuvyöry olisi katkaissut välipohjien yksin välittämän rakenteellisen (jäykistys)yhteyden coren ja tuben väliltä yhdellä ulkoseinällä, mikä olisi antanut rakennuksensivulle kiertymisen pilareille ja kimppu- nurjahduksen mahdollisuuden ja tuonut yläosan alas, sisus core vähän edellä ulkoseinäputki tubea. Ei olisi tarvittu eikä paloa, eikä räjähteitä.

https://asiakas.kotisivukone.com/files/kansanaani.kotisivukone.com/kns4-11.pdf


MIten WTC-7 romahti

WTC 7 oli 47-kerroksinen, 180 m korkuinen,  80 m leveä, 40 m "paksu" pohjakuval-taan puolisuunnikkaan muotoinen toimistorakennus, joka paloi ja romahti iskun seu-rauksena,vaikka siihen ei osunut lentokonetta.Kuten torneissa,siinäkin oli suunniteltu paikalleensortumismekanismi, jos se kuitenikin hajoaa vaikka hurrikaanimyrskyssä tai ohjusiskussa. Toisin kuin torneissa tässä mekanismissa oli ainakin yksi erikoiase-massa oleva ns. kriittinen pilari,josta rakennus olisi voitu kellarista myös räjäyttää yhdellä suurella panoksella sammutustöihin liittyen putoamaan samalla tavalla ulkoa katsoen kuin nytkin tapahtui. Siinä ei olisi ollut mitään rikollista. silla rakennus oli tyhjä ja palanut jo yli 7 tuntia. 

Fairbanksin ”tutkijat" eivät kuitenkaan lainkaan tutki TÄTÄ (teknillistä) mahdollisuut-ta, vaikka räjäyttämisen nimiin vannovatkin, eivät edes mainitse sitä. He ajavat takaa (yhtä mahdotonta kuin torneissakin) ”räjäytyspurkumallia”, jossa kukin keskipilari oli-si erikseen räjäytetty, ja että ne olisivat olleet pahat metkut mielessä esipanostettuja.

Myös WTC-7 olisi voitu luhistaa ”mällinpudotusmenetelmälläkin”, mikä kertoo, että ei taida olla maailman hedelmällisintä arvioida paikallisia ylikuormitus- ja ylikuumene-mistilanteita NISTin ja FEMAn ja USA:n oikeusviranomaisten todistamiseksi tenheen ”suttaperkkaa” ja joidenkuiden muiden mitä pöyristyttävimpiä fyysisiä rikoksia infoso- tatarkoituksissa. Rakennuksen erikoinen poikkileikkauskin palveli paitsi silmää myös paikalleenluhistumista. Mälli olisi pitänyt pudottaa kuvassa kriittisen pilarin palkkilin-jan (violetti) oikealla puolella.

Screenshot_2020-04-13%20A%20Structural%2

WTC-7 kerrosten välipohjaelementtikaavio, jossa kriittinen pilari 79 ja "kriitinen palkkilinja" 26-44 (violetti).


Screenshot_2020-04-13%20A%20Structural%2

NISTin siirtymämalli romahduksen alkaessa laskennallisen simulaation mukaan, siir-tymät ovat luettavuuden takia kymmenkertiasesti liioiteltuja:kriitisen pilarin palkkilinja pullistuu enimmillään noin 40 cm pohjoiseen eli pitemmän yhdensuuntaisen sivun suuntaan.

NISTin animaatiovideo sortumismekanismista:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fIAK6PAeyn8

Mulla ei ole ollut syytä epäillä NISTIN tuloksia - eikä ole nytkään.


Screenshot_2020-04-08%20A%20Structural%2

Tutkimuksella on myös eräitä jornalistisia ansioita, joilla se vie ainakin keskustelua joiltakin osin myös eteenpäin. Näihin kuuluu rakennuksen detaljien kuten liitosten esittäminen kaikille ymmärettävässä muodossa. varsinaisia kuviahan niistä ei juurikaan ole ollut, mutta nyt sellaiset on piirretty ja julkaistu.

Keskeisten järeiden kantavien osien pilarien ja palkkien liitokset ovat tavattoman heppoisia "ripustuksia" vastoin tavanomaisia yleisiä suunnitteluperiaatteita, joissa liitos ei saisi olla rakenteen heikoin kohta - ellei sellaiseen ole jokin erityinen syy (kuten tässäkin on: suunniteltu paikoilleenputoaminmekanismi, JOS rakennuksen jäykistykset pettävät!

Kuvan palkit ja pilarit EIVÄT VOISI TOIMIA MINKÄÄN RISTIKOIDUN SEINÄN SAUVOINA, koska pultit paukkuisivat poikki tuulesta) vaan rakennuksen kaiken JÄYKISTYKSEN täytyy todellakin tulla muualta: ulkoseinistä ja välipohjista.

Tutkijat arvostelivat NISTiä aivan erityisesti "matkien vetämisestä suoriksi" liitosten mallintamisessa (se on varmaan nämäkin mallintanut niveliksi), mutta silti ainakaan minulla ei ole näyttöä NISTin lopputulosta vääristävästä pelkistämisestä.Toki sellais- ta ohjaa AINA käsitys murtomekanismista. Siinä mielessä NISTinkään toiminta ei ole ollut "agendavapaata" - kuten ei juuri mikään tutkimus.


***

Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth (AE911Truth) -organisaation valitus NISTin toiminnasta oheisen "tutkimuksen pohjalta:

https://files.wtc7report.org/file/public-download/RFC-to-NIST-WTC7-Report-04-15-20.pdf


April 15, 2020
 
Catherine Fletcher Director, NIST Management and Organization Office National Institute of Standards and Technology 100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 3220 Gaithersburg, MD 20899-3220
 Re: Request for Correction Under the Data Quality Act to NIST’s Final Report on the Collapse of World Trade Center Building 7


 Dear Ms. Fletcher:
 
This petition is a request for correction of information disseminated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”). This Request for Correction (the “Re-quest”) is being submitted by 10 family members of people killed on September 11, 2001, by 88 architects and structural engineers, and by the organization Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth, Inc. (referred to herein collectively as “Requesters”). It is being submitted under Section 515 of Public Law 106-554 (commonly known as the Data Quality Act or Information Quality Act;herein referred to as the “DQA”), the Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB’s”) government-wide Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility,and Integrity of Information Dissemina- ted by Federal Agencies (the “OMB Guidelines”),and NIST’s “Guidelines, Information Quality Standards, and Administrative Mechanism” (the “NIST IQS”).


This Request is being submitted as a single document signed by multiple Reques-ters in order to avoid submitting duplicative Requests. However, each Requester reserves the right to appeal the outcome of NIST’s determination of the merits of this Request either jointly or severally, in each Requester’s sole discretion. Requesters prefer to be contacted via email through the designated representative of Architects & Engineers for 9/11 Truth whenever possible. Requesters also request that NIST not distribute the Requesters’ contact information listed below to anyone not officially in-volved in addressing this Request. If this Request is published on NIST’s website or elsewhere, a redacted version should be published omitting the Requesters’ contact information.
 
The information that is the subject of this Request is NIST’s Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Building 7 (NCSTAR 1A) and NIST’s Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7 (NCSTAR 1-9), collectively referred to herein as the “NIST WTC 7 Report.

Secondarily, NIST’s webpage titled FAQs – NIST WTC 7 Investigation (referred to herein as the “NIST WTC 7 FAQs”) is also the subject of this Request. The NIST WTC 7 Report can be found at the following NIST webpage:

https://www.nist.gov/el/final-reports-nist-world-trade-center-disaster-investigation

(last visited April 14, 2020). The NIST WTC 7 FAQs can be found at the following NIST webpage:

https://www.nist.gov/topics/disaster-failure-studies/faqs-nist-wtc-7-investigation

(last visited April 14, 2020).

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As described more fully below, the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs contain information that clearly violates the DQA, the OMB Guidelines, and the NIST IQS, and such violations significantly and adversely affect Requesters. The items of information that fail to comply with the DQA, the OMB Guidelines, and the NIST IQS, presented in Section V of this Request in two parts, are as follows (at the pages of this Request referenced):


 Part 1: NIST’s Computer Simulations


 A. Column 79 Side Plate (page 8)

B. Thermal Expansion of Beam K3004 (page 15) C. Girder A2001 Web Stiffeners (page 18)

D. Reported Cascade of Floor Failures (page 22)

E. NIST’s Global Collapse Analyses (page 26)


 Part 2: NIST’s Omission and Distortion of Evidence of Explosions and Incendiaries
 

F. Seismogram Data (page 49)

G. Eyewitness and Audio Evidence of Explosions (page 55)

H. Severely Eroded Steel from WTC 7 (page 80)

2
 
I. THE NIST WTC 7 REPORT AND THE NIST WTC 7 FAQs CONTAIN INFORMATION UNDER THE NIST IQS


The NIST IQS defines information as follows (see NIST IQS, Part I, Definitions):
 
Information means any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or data, in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual forms. This definition includes information that an agency disseminates from a Web page but does not include the provision of hyperlinks to information that others disseminate. This definition does not include opinions, where the agency’s presentation makes it clear that what is being offered is someone’s opinion rather than fact or the agency’s views.
 
Information contained in the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs falls un-der the definition of information because it is a communication of facts and data. Infor-mation contained in the NIST WTC 7 FAQs specifically falls under the definition of in-formation because it is information disseminated from a webpage. Furthermore, no-where within the NIST WTC 7 Report or the NIST WTC 7 FAQs does NIST “make it clear that what is being offered is someone’s opinion rather than fact or the agency’s views.” NIST states that, although it consulted an outside advisory committee, “The content of the reports and recommendations . . . are solely the responsibility of NIST.” (See NCSTAR 1A, p. xxx.) NIST, through the National Construction Safety Team Act (Pub. Law 107-231, 15 U.S.C. § 7301 et seq.) (the “NCST Act”) is required by law to generate such information. (See 15 U.S.C. § 7301 et seq.) Thus, the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs contain information that is covered by the DQA and the NIST IQS.


II. THE NIST WTC 7 REPORT AND THE NIST WTC 7 FAQs WERE DISSEMINATED BY NIST

The NIST IQS defines dissemination as follows (see NIST IQS, Part I, Definitions):
 
Dissemination means agency initiated or sponsored distribution of information to the public. Dissemination does not include distribution limited to government employees or agency contractors or grantees; intra- or inter-agency use or sharing of government information; and responses to requests for agency records under the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act or other similar law. This definition also does not include distribution limited to correspondence with individuals or persons, press releases, archival records, public filings, subpoenas or adjudicative processes.
 
The NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs were clearly disseminated by NIST. Specifically, NIST was required by law to generate the NIST WTC 7 Report under the NCST Act and did in fact generate the NIST WTC 7 Report in November 2008. (See 15 U.S.C. § 7307 mandating the issuance of a final public report follo-wing the investigation.) The NIST WTC 7 Report was disseminated by NIST via the following webpage:

https://www.nist.gov/el/final-reports-nist-world-trade-center-disaster-investigation.

The NIST WTC 7 FAQs were disseminated by NIST via the following webpage:

https://www.nist.gov/topics/disaster-failure-studies/faqs-nist-wtc-7-investigation.

Thus, the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs were disseminated by NIST.
 
 
 
III. CORRECTION OF THE NIST WTC 7 REPORT AND THE NIST WTC 7 FAQs WOULD SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE


 Under the NIST IQS, no initial request for correction will be considered concerning “disseminated information the correction of which would serve no useful purpose.” (See NIST IQS, Part III(B)(3).)
 
This exception clearly does not apply to this Request.The horrendous attacks of Sep- tember 11, 2001,were the worst attacks on American soil since Pearl Harbor,and per-haps the worst such attacks in the history of the United States. Nearly 3,000 people died on 9/11, and the vast majority of them died in the World Trade Center. Just as many or more have died after 9/11 as a result of exposure to the toxic and corrosive materials that contaminated the air following the collapse of WTC 7, WTC 1, and WTC 2.  
 
NIST was statutorily tasked with telling the 9/11 victims’ families, the building and fire safety industries, the American people, and the U.S. government how and why WTC 7 collapsed.If NIST,through the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs, has disseminated inaccurate, unreliable, or biased information about the collapse of the WTC 7, the implications would stretch across the entire architectural and political landscape.

3

First, the dissemination by NIST of inaccurate, unreliable, or biased information concerning the collapse of WTC 7 may lead to (and may have already led to) the adoption of unnecessary and improper changes to building codes, standards, and practices. These changes to building codes, standards, and practices could, in turn, lead to needless deaths and injuries if such codes and standards are too lenient or to unnecessary expenses if they are too strict.
 
Second, immense political and policy ramifications would flow from the correction of inaccurate, unreliable, or biased information disseminated by NIST concerning the collapse of WTC 7.

Specifically, should the correction of such information render a finding that the collapse of WTC 7 was caused not by fires but by a controlled demolition, it would instantly cast extreme doubt on NIST’s finding that the total destruction of the WTC Towers was caused by the airplane impacts and ensuing fires and would most likely lead to congressional and criminal investigations to identify those responsible for the destruction of all three buildings.

The process and outcome of such investigations would most likely fundamentally reshape the American people’s understanding of the 9/11 attacks and have broad and profound influence on the policies of the U.S. government.
 
Thus, the degree to which the correction of information contained in the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs would serve a useful purpose cannot be overstated.
 
 
 
IV. APPLICABLE INFORMATION QUALITY STANDARDS SUMMARY


 A. Information Quality Standards Summary for All Information


 Under the OMB Guidelines and the NIST IQS, information quality comprises three elements: utility, integrity, and objectivity. (See NIST IQS, Part II.) This Request will address several distinct items of information contained within the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs. For each item of information so addressed, this Request will describe in detail how such information fails to comply with at least one of these three elements of information quality. The standards for each of the three information quality elements are summarized below.
 
“Utility” under the NIST IQS means that the information is “useful to its intended users.” (See id.) The term “useful,” in turn, means that the information is “helpful, be-neficial, or serviceable to its intended users.” (See id.) The NIST IQS further provides that “Where the usefulness of information will be enhanced by greater transparency, care is taken that sufficient background and detail are available, either with the disse-minated information or through other means, to maximize the usefulness of the infor-mation. The level of such background and detail is commensurate with the impor-tance of the particular information,balanced against the resources required,and is ap- propriate to the nature and timeliness of the information to be disseminated.” (See id.)
 

5


“Integrity” under the NIST IQS means that before information is disseminated by NIST, it is “safeguarded from improper access, modification, or destruction.” (See id.) Furthermore, the integrity of information is protected “to a degree commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the loss,misuse,or unauthorized access to or modification of such information.” (See id.)
 
“Objectivity” under the NIST IQS means that the information is “accurate, reliable, and unbiased.” (See id.) Moreover, “objective” information is “presented in an accurate, clear, complete,and unbiased manner.” In the case of scientific information, “the origi- nal and supporting data are generated, and the analytic results are developed, using sound statistical and research methods.” (See id.)


 B. Information Quality Standards Background for Influential Information


 The OMB Guidelines and the NIST IQS apply stricter quality standards to the disse-mination of information that is considered “influential.” (See 67 F.R. 8455; NIST IQS, Part II.) The OMB Guidelines define as “influential” information that “will have or does have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies or important private sector decisions.” (See id.) The NIST IQS defines “influential” similarly. (See NIST IQS, Part II.)
 
In regards to influential scientific information and analytic results related thereto, the OMB Guidelines dictate that “agency guidelines shall generally require sufficient transparency about data and methods that an independent reanalysis could be un-dertaken by a qualified member of the public.” (See 67 F.R.8460.) Citing OMB Guide- lines, the NIST IQS states that “agency guidelines shall include a high degree of transparency about data and methods to facilitate the reproducibility of such information by qualified third parties.” (See NIST IQS, Part II.)
 
“Reproducibility” under the NIST IQS means that the information is “capable of being substantially reproduced, subject to an acceptable degree of imprecision. For infor-mation judged to have more (less) important impacts, the degree of imprecision that is tolerated is reduced (increased).” The NIST IQS states that “With respect to analy-tic results,‘capable of being substantially reproduced’ means that independent analy- sis of the original or supporting data using identical methods would generate similar analytic results, subject to an acceptable degree of imprecision or error.” (See id.) In other words, if independent analysis of the original or supporting data using identical methods does not generate similar analytic results, the disseminated information does not meet the reproducibility standard imposed on “influential” information.


 C. The NIST WTC 7 Report Contains “Influential” Scientific Information


As stated previously, the NIST WTC 7 Report was mandated by the NCST Act. (See 15 U.S.C. § 7307.) However, the NCST Act mandate went even further than simply requiring the dissemination of a final report on NIST’s findings. The NCST Act also required NIST to “recommend, as necessary, specific improvements to building standards, codes and practices,” and recommend “actions needed to improve the structural safety of buildings, and improve evacuation and emergency response procedures.” (See 15 U.S.C. § 7301(a)(2)(C), (D).)

It is clear that the NIST WTC 7 Report has had (and will continue to have) a “clear and substantial impact on important public policies” because it has impacted “buil-ding standards, codes and practices.” It is also clear that the NIST WTC 7 Report has had (and will continue to have) a clear and substantial impact on “important private sector decisions” because it has impacted structural requirements for the construction of buildings and evacuation and emergency response procedures, as well as the costs builders incur in constructing steel-framed high-rise structures. Moreover, in the same way that immense political and policy ramifications would flow from the correc-tion of inaccurate,unreliable, or biased information disseminated by NIST concerning the collapse of WTC 7, so have immense political and policy ramifications flowed from (and will continue to flow from) NIST’s finding that the collapse of WTC 7 was caused by fires and not by a controlled demolition. For all of these reasons, the NIST WTC 7 Report clearly qualifies as “influential” scientific information under the OMB Guidelines and the NIST IQS.
 
 
 
V. INFORMATION IN THE NIST WTC 7 REPORT AND THE NIST WTC 7 FAQs VIOLATES THE OMB GUIDELINES AND NIST INFORMATION QUALITY STANDARDS


This section describes several distinct items of information contained within the NIST WTC 7 Report and the NIST WTC 7 FAQs that fail to comply with the DQA, the OMB Guidelines, and the NIST IQS.
 
The only way that each of these information quality violations can ultimately be addressed is for NIST to develop a new “Probable Collapse Sequence” that is both physically possible and consistent with the data presented herein.
 
 
Part 1: NIST’s Computer Simulations


The first four items of information described in Part 1 relate to the initiating local fai-lure that NIST claims began the Probable Collapse Sequence. The NIST WTC 7 Re-port summarizes the initiating local failure as follows, with the bolded text highlighting the three items of information to be addressed (see NCSTAR 1A, p. 21-22):
 

The initiating local failure that began the probable WTC 7 collapse sequence was the buckling of Column 79. This buckling arose from a process that occurred at tem-peratures at or below approximately 400 °C (750 °F), which are well below the tem-peratures considered in current practice for determining fire resistance ratings asso-ciated with significant loss of steel strength.When steel (or any other metal) is heated, it expands. If thermal expansion in steel beams is resisted by columns or other steel members, forces develop in the structural members that can result in buckling of beams or failures of connections.

6
 
Fire-induced thermal expansion of the floor system surrounding Column 79 led to the collapse of Floor 13, which triggered a cascade of floor failures. In this case, the floor beams on the east side of the building expanded enough that they pushed the girder spanning between Columns 79 and 44 to the west on the 13th floor. (See Figure 1–5 for column numbering and the locations of girders and beams.) This movement was enough for the girder to walk off of its support at Column 79.

The unsupported girder and other local fire-induced damage caused Floor 13 to col-lapse, beginning a cascade of floor failures down to the 5th floor (which, as noted in Section 1.2.3, was much thicker and stronger). Many of these floors had already been at least partially weakened by the fires in the vicinity of Column 79. This left Column 79 with insufficient lateral support, and as a consequence, the column buckled eastward, becoming the initial local failure for collapse initiation.


The structural elements mentioned above are shown below in Figure 1.5 of NCSTAR 1A. The blue arrow indicates the westward direction in which, according to NIST, the floor beams thermally expanded and caused the girder (Girder A2001) to walk off its support at Column 79.

Screenshot_2020-04-17%20Request%20for%20


The four items of information presented below that relate to the initiating local failure involve

(A) the Column 79 side plate,

(B) the thermal expansion of beam K3004,

(C) the Girder A2001 web stiffeners, and

(D) the reported cascade of floor failures from Floor 13 down to Floor 5.

As demonstrated below, correction of any one of these violations leads to the conclusion that NIST’s Probable Collapse Sequence was physically impossible and must be discarded.

7
 
 A. COLUMN 79 SIDE PLATE


1. NIST’s 16-Story ANSYS Model Ignored the Effect that Column 79’s Side Plate Would Have Had in Preventing the Walk-Off of Girder A2001,Thus Violating the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS  Column 79 was a W14 x 730 standard structural shape column with 2” x 26” built-up side plates welded to its flanges at Floor 13. Column 79 and its side plates are pictured in Figures 8-21 and 8-23 of NCSTAR 1-9, shown below, with the western side plate pointed out. The dimensions of the side plates are given in the fabrication shop drawings. (See Frankel Steel Limited, Drawing 1091.)

Screenshot_2020-04-17%20Request%20for%20

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Preliminary analysis conducted by NIST using LS-DYNA software,presented in Section 8.8 of NCSTAR 1-9,as well as analysis conducted at the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) using ABAQUS software,demonstrates that when Girder A2001 and the adjoining floor beams are heated according to NIST’s assumptions (to 500°C and 600 °C, respectively), Girder A2001 expands and becomes trapped behind the side plate on the western side of Column 79 as it is pushed to the west by the thermally expanding floor beams. The NIST WTC 7 Report states the following (see NCSTAR 1-9, p. 349-353):
 
 A finite element analysis of the northeast corner floor system was conducted to eva-luate its response to elevated temperatures and to confirm which failure modes nee-ded to be accounted for in the 16-story ANSYS model. A finite element model of the northeast corner was developed using the LS-DYNA software that included the de-sign details described in the previous section such as shear studs on the beams and seat connections at the girder ends and exterior ends of the beams.
 
 . . . For Column 79, the flange on the north face and the extending portions of the side cover plates were modeled to allow for contact with the girder. . . .
 
 . . . Continued axial expansion of the floor beams pushed the girder laterally at Co-lumn 79, as shown in Figure 8–26,in which failed shear studs and bolts were evident. . . . Continued axial expansion of the girder caused it to bear against the face of Co-lumn 79,generating large axial forces that led to failure of the bolts connecting the gir- der to Column 44. (Emphasis added.)    The trapping of Girder A2001 behind the Co-lumn 79 side plate in NIST’s preliminary LS-DYNA analysis is illustrated graphically in Figure 8-26 of Section 8.8 shown below. Juxtaposing Figure 8.23 (left) with Figure 8.26 (right) illustrates the westward travel of Girder A2001.

 
 
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The analysis conducted at UAF produced identical findings to NIST’s preliminary LSDYNA analysis in terms of Girder A2001 becoming trapped behind the Column 79 side plate. The UAF team’s report, A Structural Reevaluation of World Trade Center 7 (referred to hereafter as “UAF Report”), states (see UAF Report, p. 77-79):
 
 First, we found that when girder A2001 is heated, it expands such that it becomes trapped behind the side plate on the western side of Column 79 as it is pushed to the west by thermally expanded beams K3004, C3004, B3004, A3004, and G3005 (see Figure 3.4). . . .

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. . .Figure 3.5 [shown below] shows the girder bearing seat at Column 79 is 12 inches wide. The flange width for W33 x 130 girder A2001 is 11.510 inches wide and cen-tered on the seat; its web is 0.580 inches thick. This would require a lateral travel dis-tance of 6.290 inches for the web to be beyond the seat. However, the distance bet-ween the column side plates is 17.89 inches. The girder and bearing seat are slightly off center to the east, with just 3.678 inches between the girder's western edge and Column 79's western side plate. Thus, the side plate prevents the girder’s web from traveling beyond the bearing seat. (Emphasis added.)

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Contradicting the finding of its preliminary LS-DYNA analysis that Girder A2001 would become trapped behind the side plate on the western side of Column 79 - a finding corroborated by the UAF analysis - NIST somehow ultimately concludes that “the floor beams on the east side of the building expanded enough that they pushed the girder spanning between Columns 79 and 44 to the west on the 13th floor. . . . This movement was enough for the girder to walk off of its support at Column 79.” (See NCSTAR 1A, p. 22. Emphasis added.)

The NIST WTC 7 Report provides no analysis, calculations,or figures explaining how Girder A2001 moved westward past the Column 79 side plate enough for it to walk off of its support at Column 79 in its 16-story ANSYS model. The NIST WTC 7 Report merely states in general terms (see NCSTAR 1-9, p. 527):
 

A girder was considered to have lost vertical support when its web was no longer supported by the bearing seat. The bearing seat at Column 79 was 11 in. wide. Thus, when the girder end at Column 79 had been pushed laterally at least 5.5 in., it was no longer supported by the bearing seat.1
 
The only place where NIST addresses the discrepancies between its preliminary LSDYNA analysis and its 16-story ANSYS model is in FAQ #35 of the NIST WTC 7 FAQs, where it states:
 
 Differences between the results of the partial floor model and the 16-story model are to be expected. Reasons for these differences include:

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1 Independent researchers later discovered that the bearing seat at Column 79 was actually 12 inches wide. In response, NIST issued an erratum in June 2012 that adjusted the distance needed for walk-off to 6.25 inches.

1. While the partial floor model used a simplified thermal loading scenario, in which the beam and girder temperatures were uniform and were increased monotonically (see Figure 8-25 of NCSTAR 1-9),the 16-story ANSYS model used computed tempe- ratures based on fire dynamics and thermal calculations.

[Note: Figure 8-25 is mentioned in FAQ #35 but not included in this Request because it is not necessary to show.]


 2. While the columns in the partial floor model were fixed against lateral displace-ments, the columns in the 16-story model were allowed to move laterally based on the response of the structural system.


 3. While the partial floor model applied rotational and in-plane translational constraints along the west and south boundaries of the floor slab, the 16story model represented the entire slab for all floors.
 
The above-stated reasons for discrepancies between the results of the preliminary LSDYNA analysis and the 16-story ANSYS model fall well short of explaining to an acceptable degree of scientific precision why Girder A2001 became trapped behind the Column 79 side plate in the preliminary LS-DYNA analysis but not in the 16-story ANSYS model.
 
 Regarding the first reason stated in NIST WTC 7 FAQ #35,since NIST does not spe- cify how the computed temperatures produced different results from the simplified thermal loading scenario, we are left to assume that the computed temperatures may have heated the floor beams first and caused Girder A2001 to be pushed at least 3.678 inches to the west before it expanded enough to become trapped behind the Column 79 side plate. However, calculations regarding the thermal expansion po-tential of Girder A2001 shown below demonstrate that it needed to be heated only to 70 °C to move within the envelope of the Column 79 side plate if unrestrained.

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Reinforcing these calculations, NIST’s own preliminary LS-DYNA analysis results shown below demonstrate that at 131 °C, there was sufficient expansion of Girder A2001 to cause the seat bolts at Column 79 to fail. At 164 °C, there was sufficient expansion of Girder A2001 to cause both top clip bolts at Column 79 to fail. The NIST WTC 7 Report states (see NCSTAR 1-9, p. 352-353):
 
 The predicted response of the system is summarized in Table 8–2. The first failures observed were of the shear studs, which were produced by axial expansion of the floor beams, and which began to occur at fairly low beam temperature of 103 °C.

Axial expansion of the girder then led to shear failure of the bolts at the connection to Column 79; and, at a girder temperature of 164 °C, all four erection bolts had failed, leaving that end of the girder essentially unrestrained against rotation. (Emphasis added.)

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Once unrestrained due to these connection failures and exceeding 160 °C, Girder A2001 would move at least .36742 inches within the envelope of the Column 79 side plate.
 
The Case B floor temperatures used in NIST’s 16-story ANSYS model are somewhat difficult to decipher in Figure 10-39 below. (The Case B floor temperatures are the computed worst-case scenario temperatures, which NIST then used in its global col-lapse analyses.) Nevertheless, careful review indicates that the temperatures of Gir-der A2001 and the floor beams to its east were approximately the same until at least 3:30 PM, and that Girder A2001 reached temperatures 164 °C (enough for it to move within the envelope of the Column 79 side plate) long before the floor beams to its east were heated sufficiently to push Girder A2001 to the west at least 3.678 inches.

Focusing on beam K3004, which was the closest beam to Column 79 framing into Girder A2001,and thus dictated the extent of westward displacement of Girder A2001 at Column 79, the thermal expansion from room temperature length would be only 2.527 inches at 300 °C and would not reach 3.700 inches until 430 °C (based on NIST’s Coefficient of Thermal Expansion (CTE) value for steel of 1.4 x 10-5 in/in-°C, and the room temperature (20 °C) length of beam K3004 of 644-11/16 inches).

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Regarding the second reason stated in NIST WTC 7 FAQ #35 for discrepancies bet-ween the preliminary LS-DYNA analysis and the 16-story ANSYS model, neither the NIST WTC 7 Report nor the NIST WTC 7 FAQs provide any narrative description, let alone supporting analysis, indicating that Column 79 experienced any displacement that would have facilitated the walk-off of Girder A2001. While NIST offers only a vague mention of the possibility of column displacement, the UAF analysis finds that Column 79 would have been pushed to the east 1.8 to 1.915 inches and to the north .7293 to .94 inches when heated according to NIST’s assumptions, but that the west-ward displacement of Girder A2001 relative to Column 79 would be less than 1 inch. (See UAF Report, p. 66, p. 71.) In other words, Girder A2001 would also be pushed east due to the relative lack of stiffness of the eastern exterior,resulting in less relative displacement between Girder A2001 and Column 79 than the total eastward displacement of Column 79.
 
 Meanwhile, the third reason stated in NIST WTC 7 FAQ #35 for discrepancies between the preliminary LS-DYNA analysis and the 16-story ANSYS model does not apply to the question of whether Girder A2001 would become trapped behind the Column 79 side plate.
 
 In summary, NIST’s preliminary LS-DYNA analysis and the UAF analysis demonst-rate that Girder A2001 would have become trapped behind the Column 79 side plate when heated according to NIST’s assumptions. Thus, the first major step leading to the initiating local failure in NIST’s Probable Collapse Sequence - the walk-off of Gir-der A2001 - was physically impossible. Furthermore, the NIST WTC 7 Report does not provide any analyses, calculations, or figures sufficient to demonstrate that Girder A2001 could have moved past the Column 79 side plate enough to walk off its sup-port at Column 79. Thus, we deduce that NIST’s 16-story ANSYS model ignored the effect that Column 79’s side plate would have had in preventing the walk-off of Girder A2001.   
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As a result, NIST’s claim that Girder A2001 moved past the Column 79 side plate fails to comply with the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS because it lacks objectivity, utility, transparency, and reproducibility.
 
First, NIST’s claim is inaccurate, unreliable,and apparently biased because it contra-dicts the valid findings of its own analysis and those of the UAF analysis, thus viola-ting the objectivity element of information quality under the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS. NIST’s claim also violates the objectivity element of information quality because it is not presented in a complete manner. Second, NIST’s claim violates the utility element of information quality because care was not taken to make sufficient background and detail available regarding its claim, even though greater transparen-cy would have enhanced the usefulness of the information disseminated. NIST mere-ly provides a brief summary of its analysis results and a superficial FAQ that falls well short of explaining the discrepancies in its analyses to an acceptable degree of scientific precision. Third, NIST’s claim violates the transparency standard imposed upon influential information because NIST did not practice a degree of transparency sufficient to facilitate reproducibility. Finally, NIST’s claim violates the reproducibility standard imposed upon influential information because — to the extent that indepen-dent analysis of the original data using identical methods could be performed — contradictory analytic results were generated.


 2. Corrections Sought:


a) Revise the NIST WTC 7 Report to Reflect that the Column 79 Side Plate Would Have Prevented Girder A2001 from Moving Westward Enough to Walk Off Its Support at Column 79   

First, NIST must revise the NIST WTC 7 Report to reflect that the Column 79 side plate would have prevented Girder A2001 from moving westward enough to walk off its support at Column 79. Alternatively, if NIST maintains that Girder A2001 was able to move past the Column 79 side plate, it must amend the NIST WTC 7 Report to include analysis that satisfies the objectivity, utility, transparency, and reproducibility standards of information quality.

b) Discard the Probable Collapse Sequence and Develop a New Probable Collapse Sequence that Is Physically Possible

Second, assuming that NIST revises the NIST WTC 7 Report to reflect that the Column 79 side plate would have prevented Girder A2001 from moving westward enough to walk off its support at Column 79,NIST must discard its Probable Collapse Sequence and develop a new Probable Collapse Sequence that is physically possible.
 
 
B. THERMAL EXPANSION OF BEAM K3004


1. NIST Ignored the Limit of How Far Beam K3004 Could Thermally Expand and Its Resulting Inability to Cause the Walk-Off of Girder A2001, Thus Violating the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS.

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As noted above, beam K3004 was the closest beam to Co-lumn 79 framing into Gir-der A2001 from the east. Therefore, the thermal expansion of beam K3004 dictated the extent of westward displacement of Girder A2001 at Column 79. Beam K3004 is indicated in Figures 1-5 and 8-21 of NCSTAR 1-9 below.

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Initially, the NIST WTC 7 Report stated that the amount of westward displacement required to make Girder A2001 walk off its support at Column 79 was 5.5 inches, based on the bearing seat having a width of 11 inches (see NCSTAR 1-9, p. 527):

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A girder was considered to have lost vertical support when its web was no longer supported by the bearing seat. The bearing seat at Column 79 was 11 in. wide. Thus, when the girder end at Column 79 had been pushed laterally at least 5.5 in., it was no longer supported by the bearing seat.  


Subsequently, independent researchers discovered that the bearing seat at Column 79 was actually 12 inches wide and informed NIST of the error. In response, NIST issued an erratum in June 2012 that adjusted the bearing seat width to 12 inches and the distance needed for walk-off to 6.25 inches. In its erratum, NIST claimed that the errors were merely typographical and that “[t]he dimensions and lateral displacements used in the analyses were correct. (See Errata for NIST NCSTAR 1A, NIST NCSTAR 1-9, and NIST NCSTAR 1-9A, p. 2.)
 
 However, the correction from 5.5 inches to 6.25 inches in fact made the walk-off of Girder A2001 under NIST’s Probable Collapse Sequence physically impossible for a second reason.As shown in the Exhibit D spreadsheet calculating the thermal expan- sion of beam K3004 at different temperatures, the maximum net thermal expansion of beam K3004 is 5.728 inches, which occurs at 654 °C. It is at this temperature that the marginal increase in shortening due to heat-induced sagging begins to exceed the marginal increase in heat-induced expansion. Beam K3004 thus becomes progres-sively shorter as it is heated to higher temperatures. Therefore, it was physically impossible for beam K3004 to push Girder A2001 westward at least 6.25 inches, because the furthest beam K3004 could expand was 5.728 inches.
 
 As in the case of NIST ignoring the effect that the Column 79 side plate would have had in preventing the walk-off of Girder A2001, the NIST WTC 7 Report provides no analysis, calculations,or figures explaining how beam K3004 expanded sufficiently to make Girder A2001 walk off of its support at Column 79 in its 16-story ANSYS model.
 
 In summary, straightforward analysis of how far beam K3004 could thermally expand demonstrates that the first major step leading to the initiating local failure in NIST’s Probable Collapse Sequence is physically impossible for a second reason. Even if Girder A2001 had not become trapped behind the Column 79 side plate, it would not have walked off its support at Column 79 because the maximum thermal expansion of beam K3004 was less than the 6.25 inches needed to push the web of Girder A2001 past the edge of its bearing seat.
 
 As a result, NIST’s claim that beam K3004 expanded enough that it caused Girder A2001 to walk off of its support at Column 79 fails to comply with the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS because it lacks objectivity, utility, transparency, and reproducibility.
 
First, NIST’s claim is inaccurate, unreliable, and apparently biased because it is inconsistent with the limit of how far beam K3004 could thermally expand.

Second,NIST’s failure to show how far beam K3004 expanded in its 16-story ANSYS model violates the objectivity element of information quality because NIST’s claim is not presented in a complete manner. If the analyses indicated that Girder A2001 was pushed laterally at least 6.25 inches, as NIST claimed in its June 2012 erratum, NIST should specify how far beam K3004 expanded. NIST’s failure to show how far beam K3004 expanded also violates the utility element of information quality because care was not taken to make sufficient background and detail available regarding its claim, even though greater transparency would have enhanced the usefulness of the infor-mation disseminated.

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Third,NIST’s claim violates the transparency standard imposed upon influential infor- mation because NIST did not practice a degree of transparency sufficient to facilitate reproducibility. Finally, NIST’s claim violates the reproducibility standard imposed upon influential information because — to the extent that indepen-dent analysis of the original data could be performed — contradictory analytic results were generated.


2. Corrections Sought:


a) Revise the NIST WTC 7 Report to Reflect that Beam K3004 Could Not Thermally Expand Enough to Cause the Walk-Off of Girder A2001   

First, NIST must revise the NIST WTC 7 Report to reflect that beam K3004 could not thermally expand enough to cause the walk-off of Girder A2001. Alternatively, if NIST maintains that beam K3004 was able to thermally expand enough to cause the walk-off of Girder A2001, it must amend the NIST WTC 7 Report to include analysis that satisfies the objectivity, utility, transparency, and reproducibility standards of information quality.

b) Discard the Probable Collapse Sequence and Develop a New Probable Collapse Sequence that Is Physically Possible
 

Second, assuming that NIST revises the NIST WTC 7 Report to reflect that beam K3004 could not thermally expand enough to cause the walk-off of Girder A2001, NIST must discard its Probable Collapse Sequence and develop a new Probable Collapse Sequence that is physically possible.
 
 
C. GIRDER A2001 WEB STIFFENERS


1. NIST Omitted the Presence of Web Stiffeners on Girder A2001 That Would Have Prevented the Flange Failure and Walk-Off of Girder A2001, Thus Violating the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS


Girder A2001 had partial height web stiffeners measuring 3/4 inches thick x 5.5 inches wide x 18 inches high, as indicated in fabrication shop drawing Frankel 9114. (See Frankel Steel Limited.) These web stiffeners are drawn to scale in Figure 2 of Ronald Brookman’s 2012 paper, “A Discussion of ‘Analysis of Structural Response of WTC 7 to Fire and Sequential Failures Leading to Collapse’,” shown below. (See Brookman 2012, p. 8.)

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NIST, however, omitted these web stiffeners from its analyses. The omission of these web stiffeners is evident in Figure 8-21 of NCSTAR 1-9 (shown in the previous sec-tion) and was also confirmed via email on October 25, 2013, by NIST public affairs officer Michael Newman, who wrote (see Exhibit C):
 
 The web stiffeners shown at the end of the girder in Frankel drawing #9114 prevent web crippling. The structural analyses of WTC 7 did not show any web crippling failures. Therefore, the web crippling plates did not need to be included in the models / analyses. (Emphasis added.)

NIST’s stated reason for omitting the web stiffeners from its analyses is fundamental-ly unsound. As noted in the UAF Report,“In addition to stiffening the web, these stiffe- ners significantly increase the bending resistance of the flange and would have pre-vented it from failing due to flexure (assuming the girder were somehow able to by-pass the column side plate)”.(See UAF Report,p.81.)As illustrated in Figure 3.8 of the UAF Report, shown below, the stresses in the girder flange and stiffener are not suf-ficient to cause the flange to fail, and thus Girder A2001 would not have walked off its support at Column 79 when pushed westward 6.25 inches. (See UAF Report, p. 82.)

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As in the cases of NIST ignoring the effect of the Column 79 side plate and the ther-mal expansion limit of beam K3004, the NIST WTC 7 Report provides no analysis, calculations, or figures explaining how Girder A2001 actually walked off of its support at Column 79 in its 16story ANSYS model.As noted in the previous section, the NIST WTC 7 Report merely states in general terms (see NCSTAR 1-9, p. 527):
 
 A girder was considered to have lost vertical support when its web was no longer supported by the bearing seat. The bearing seat at Column 79 was 11 in. wide. Thus, when the girder end at Column 79 had been pushed laterally at least 5.5 in., it was no longer supported by the bearing seat.2
 
 Moreover, NIST does not address the omission of the Girder A2001 web stiffeners either in the NIST WTC 7 Report or in the NIST WTC 7 FAQs.
 
 In summary, NIST omitted from its structural analyses the presence of web stiffeners that significantly increased the bending resistance of the Girder A2001 flange and would have prevented Girder A2001 from failing due to flexure,thus preventing it from walking off its support at Column 79. When the web stiffeners that NIST omitted from its analyses are included, the first major step leading to the initiating local failure in NIST’s Probable Collapse Sequence is shown,for a third reason, to be physically im- possible. Even if Girder A2001 had not become trapped behind the Column 79 side plate and beam K3004 could thermally expand at least 6.25 inches, Girder A2001 would not have walked off its support at Column 79 due to the presence of the web stiffeners.

 
2 As noted above, NIST issued an erratum in June 2012 that adjusted the distance needed for walk-off to 6.25 inches.

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As a result, NIST’s claim that Girder A2001 walked off its support at Column 79 fails to comply with the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS because it lacks objectivity, utility, transparency, and reproducibility.
 
 First, NIST’s claim is inaccurate, unreliable, and apparently biased because it is based on the intentional omission of a known structural feature that materially affects the result of the analysis, thus violating the objectivity element of information quality under the OMB Guidelines and NIST IQS. NIST’s claim also violates the objectivity element of information quality because it is not presented in a complete manner.

Second, NIST’s claim violates the utility element of information quality because care was not taken to make sufficient background and detail available regarding its claim, even though greater transparency would have enhanced the usefulness of the infor-mation disseminated. NIST merely provides a brief summary of its analysis results and provides no statement regarding the omission of a known structural feature.

Third,NIST’s claim violates the transparency standard imposed upon influential infor- mation because NIST did not practice a degree of transparency sufficient to facilitate reproducibility. Finally, NIST’s claim violates the reproducibility standard imposed upon influential information because — to the extent that independent analysis of the original data using identical methods could be performed — contradictory analytic results were generated.


2. Corrections Sought:


a. Perform New Analyses that Includes the Web Stiffeners on Girder A2001 and Re-vise the NIST WTC 7 Report to Reflect that Girder A2001 Would Not Have Walked Off Its Support at Column 79


First, NIST must perform new analyses that include the partial height web stiffeners on Girder A2001.There is no reasonable basis for not performing these new analyses since NIST has acknowledged it omitted the web stiffeners from its analyses, and this omission has been shown to have materially affected the results of NIST’s analyses. NIST must then revise the NIST WTC 7 Report to reflect that Girder A2001 would not have walked off its support at Column 79. Alternatively, if NIST maintains that Girder A2001 was able to walk off its support at Column 79 despite the presence of the web stiffeners, it must amend the NIST WTC 7 Report to include analysis that satisfies the objectivity, utility, transparency, and reproducibility standards of information quality.


b. Discard the Probable Collapse Sequence and Develop a New Probable Collapse Sequence that Is Physically Possible  


Second, assuming that NIST revises the NIST WTC 7 report to reflect that Girder A2001 would not have walked off its support at Column 79, NIST must discard its Pro-bable Collapse Sequence and develop a new Probable Collapse Sequence that is physically possible.
 
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